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ABSTRACT 
“Poetics of Transgression” disentangles the controversies surrounding three 
contemporary art works in order to take up the role of discomfort and the practice of 
transgression in contemporary art. The criticism thesis argues that although both 
employ tactics of antagonism, shock, and oﬀense, we can delineate between 
transgression and mere oﬀense according to the work’s eﬃcacy in challenging the 
hegemonic order. Works are transgressive when they put into question the hegemonic 
order and works are oﬀensive when they reinforce the hegemonic order. The tactics of 
disturbance may be the same but the definitive feature of transgression is that it 
oversteps and shocks to stimulate dialogue and to bring into clarity that which is 
under-articulated by the hegemonic order. Whereas oﬀense obfuscates dialogue in 
order to uphold the hegemonic status quo, transgression instigates inquiry and makes 
demands of its viewer to engage with the ethical considerations of a work through 
provocation.
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INTRODUCTION 
	 Is it possible to defend oﬀensive works in a way that vindicates their ambiguous 
moral status? Or are oﬀensive practices worryingly marked by an ambivalence towards 
the moral issues that they provoke? “Poetics of Transgression” disentangles the 
controversies surrounding three contemporary art works in order to take up the role of 
oﬀense in contemporary art and the practice of transgression. Through a series of case 
studies, this paper proposes that dissent and objection to oﬀensive work and the 
debate they provoke is often preferable to censorship. Although to engage with diﬃcult 
work is challenging, this thesis argues that these challenges to our ethical norms and 
political assumptions are essential to radically free democracy.	 

	 My thesis responds to the calls for censorship of three oﬀensive works: Dana 
Schutz’s “Open Casket,” Artur Żmijewski’s “Berek,” and Renzo Martens’ “Episode III,” 
and I consider the ground on which these claims for censorship stand in order to 
consider alternative ways of engaging these oﬀensive works. Although I outline and 
establish the oﬀenses of each work, I evaluate each work for the potential of 
transgression as opposed to mere oﬀense, and I argue that those transgressive 
aspects may redeem the respective works initial oﬀenses. 

	 The current response to oﬀensive, transgressive work seems to be a polarizing 
divide between either censorship or unconditional moral relativism in defense of the 
works. I’m taking up this project because I find the current climate of responses to 
artworks that oﬀend polarizing and inadequate, as both polarized approaches sidestep 
the oﬀensive work’s ethical claims and demands on viewers. I propose that 
transgression oﬀends precisely to elicit an emotional response from its viewers in order 
to provoke ethical engagement. In avoidance of works that transgress and challenge a 
viewers assumptions and boundaries, viewers hegemonic positions are left 
unchallenged, or worse, selectively reinforced. 

	 In “Regarding The Pain of Others” Susan Sontag reminds her readers that 
although we have an obligation to look at imagery that records great cruelties and 
crimes, we have an even greater obligation to think about what it means to look at them, 
and about our capacity to actually assimilate what they show. Sontag urges us to 
translate our compassion into action, otherwise our compassion withers. This criticism 
thesis culminates to a conclusion similar to that of Sontag, that sympathy alone can be 
an impertinent response to difficult work, some works require our discomfort. 
1
	 I defend transgressive practices because they challenge us to engage with the 
less than pleasant aspects of reality, and this confrontation allows us to reflect on our 
own assumptions as viewers at an imaginative distance. This argument in defense of 
transgression relies on the premise that the institution of art is well suited to be a site of 
“agonistic conflict”  because of its ability to oﬀer viewers an imaginative distance from 2
which to consider diﬃcult topics. If deprived of the opportunity to explore diﬃcult 
topics imaginatively and to be challenged by them, we risk atrophying our ability to 
renegotiate our ethics and political views. The institution of art as a site of agonistic 
conflict allows artworks to challenge our assumptions and unsettle viewers enough to 
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003) 80.1
 For Mouﬀe, the possibility of antagonism is a constant feature of human social life, which is 2
characterized by conflicts with no rational, final resolution. Chantal Mouﬀe, Agonistics: Thinking 
The World Politically, Verso Books: 2013, 7-13.
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engage us, but does so at an imaginative distance far enough from reality so as make 
the experience of being challenged bearable. 

	 In order to clearly discuss the merit of transgressive art practices, it is important 
first to understand what is meant by the term aesthetic transgression historically. In 
Transgressions, The Oﬀenses of Art Anthony Julius distinguishes the aesthetic of 
transgression as an art committed to violating social taboos. Art historical 
transgression can be defined as an overstepping of boundaries, boundaries as laid out 
by the community in which the work will be received. More than an aesthetic genre, 
transgression describes a general oppositional practice. Julius identifies four essential 
functions that comprise the transgressive ranging from “the denying of doctrinal truths; 
rule-breaking, including the violation of principles, conventions, or taboos; the giving of 
serious oﬀense; and the exceeding, erasing or disordering of conceptual boundaries.”  
3
	 For example, Andres Serrano’s controversial photograph Piss Christ, which 
depicts a figurine of a crucified Jesus Christ in a vat of the artist’s urine, is often cited in 
the literature on transgressive work as quintessentially transgressive. Admittedly, 
Serrano’s work continues to generate controversy and public debate since the work’s 
debut in 1987, particularly because Serrano received funding for the work from the 
National Endowment for the Arts. But, what is it about Piss Christ that makes it 
transgressive? If the signature of a transgressive work is that it oversteps boundaries, 
in the case of Piss Christ, the work places what many consider to be sacred (the image 
of the crucifix) in a context that is not only profane but also abject. Transgressive art is 
thus defined in relation to its audience: there must be ethical boundaries internalized by 
 Anthony Julius, Transgressions, The Oﬀenses of Art, The University of Chicago Press, 2003, 3
31.
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the audience members that the work oversteps. Obviously, these boundaries diﬀer 
depending on the viewer, and they are assumed to vary from viewer to viewer, but 
every viewer has ethical boundaries (even radical nihilism can be placed onto an ethical 
spectrum.)

	 There are works and practices that clearly violate more boundaries than others 
and some works seem to be more transgressive because of the types of boundaries 
they violate. For example, a work resulting in a death would be considered more 
transgressive than one which merely annoyed its viewer. I do not claim to define any 
precise metric by which the transgressiveness of a work should be characterized, but it 
is clearly something which admits to degrees. Further, the transgressed boundaries 
need not be related to beliefs in the sacred, they may also take the expression of being 
at odds with expectations of what an artwork will consist of, or norms regarding social 
interaction or viewer etiquette. Art historical transgression also carries with it a unique 
aesthetic, the aesthetic of discomfort. Each of the works discussed in this thesis is 
framed as transgressive because each makes unusual demands of the audience, in a 
way that could be considered aggressive or coercive. In addition, transgressive 
practices demand engagement with the work on an ethical, as opposed to a merely 
representational level. 

	 Anthony Julius attributes contemporary art’s turn to transgress, insult, and 
oﬀend to the influence of Georges Bataille, whose thinking maintained that in a society 
dominated by concerns about productivity and order, true internal freedom can only be 
achieved by violating taboos, as a means of breaking down the barriers imposed by 
civility and reason. Bataille proposed that “fear and horror are not the real and final 
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reaction; on the contrary, they are a temptation to overstep the bounds.”  Degradation, 4
the violation of taboos, and violence, are all for Bataille mechanisms of transgression 
which facilitate a traversal into the realm of the real, as that which is beyond and prior 
to the imposition of law, language and rational order. To define transgression, Bataille 
conceptualizes a movement towards a threshold, where the self is being pushed to its 
own limits, where it uncovers new limits, in an infinite procedure; even as transgression 
liberates the self from its confines, new limits are imposed that must be transgressed 
anew.

	 Walking in tandem with transgression of the taboo, is the enforcement of limits 
as they currently stand through censorship. For clarity and consistency, censorship as 
it is referred to in this project will be defined as the suppression of words, images, or 
ideas that are perceived as disturbing by some part of the population and it happens 
whenever someone succeeds in imposing their personal political or moral values on 
another by restraining access to the content they take issue with. By contrast, when 
individuals organize in opposition to the content of which they disapprove, their actions 
are protected under their right to freedom of speech.

	 What does it mean to request the censorship of an oﬀending work, what power 
do we invest in a work that would require that action? In “Can Disputes Over 
Censorship Be Resolved?” Donald Crawford gives the logic of the censorship debate its 
most thorough treatment. Crawford frames the censorship debate traditionally, as a 
problem arising from the conflict of three different interests: (a) an interest in the 
integrity of the artistic process; (b) an interest in freedom of choice and expression; and 
 Georges Bataille, Eroticism, Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood. San Francisco: City 4
Lights Books, 1986, 144.
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(c) an interest in social control over what is socially undesirable or harmful. For 
Crawford, the cornerstone of censorship disputes appears to be the assumed 
connection between exposure to violent content and subsequent socially undesirable 
consequences.  Moral corruption, debasement, depravity, and degeneration are the 5
feared effects of exposure to representations of violence. Crawford speculates that 
behind this assumption “must lurk still another fear which reflects a conviction about 
man's inherent nature, a pessimism about the stability of his character and his 
openness to corruptive influences which is judged to require the legislation of private 
morality.”  What is corruptible is our character and this, independent of any subsequent 6
actions we may take, is what seems to be at the impasse of every censorship debate.

	 Calls for censorship are therefore not motivated by aesthetic taste, but by the 
belief that exposure to depictions of the unethical  causes people to form unethical, 
anti-social views. Pro-censorship forces often allege that viewing depictions of violence 
leads to behavioral violence, but correlational studies that seek to explain why some 
aggressive people have a history of watching a lot of violent TV suﬀer from the 
chicken-and-egg dilemma: does representation of violence cause people to behave 
aggressively, or do aggressive people prefer more violent entertainment? There is no 
definitive answer. Whatever influence representations of violence have on behavior, 
studies have concluded its eﬀects are marginal compared to other factors. According 
to the Center for Communication Policy at UCLA, even children know the diﬀerence 
between representation and reality, and their attitudes and behavior are shaped more 
 Donald Crawford, “Can Disputes Over Censorship Be Resolved?” Ethics, Vol. 78, No. 2 The 5
University of Chicago Press, 1968, 93-108. 
 Ibid, 96.6
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by life circumstances and reality than by the books they read or the programs they 
view.  
7
	 Our right to freedom of expression is based upon upholding the value that in a 
democratic society, individual adults must be free to decide for themselves what to 
read, write, paint, draw, view and hear. If we are disturbed by images of violence, we as 
individuals can decline to engage with such content. More importantly, we can also 
exercise our  own  freedom of expression rights by voicing our objections and 
condemnation to forms of expression we take oﬀense at. Justice Louis Brandeis' 
advice that the remedy for messages we disagree with or dislike in art, entertainment 
or politics is "more speech, not enforced silence,"  is as fitting today as it was when 8
given in 1927. It is the degree of public support for free speech, for all, that makes the 
diﬀerence between repression and debate. 

	 The tension between transgression and censorship opens up much broader 
questions about the role of art as an expression of truth, and the problematic 
implications of forcibly constraining that expression. That art is still capable of 
provoking debate and protest is a testament to its value and power, and an admission 
of its complexity and its links to the political. The controversy which censorship attracts 
also raises the question of the art institutions’ role in the ethics of representation, and 
the idea that such institutions might have social responsibility.

	 This paper outlines what comprises aesthetic transgression and how the 
aforementioned contemporary art works are unambiguously oﬀensive, in order to 
 Jeﬀrey Cole, The UCLA television violence monitoring report, Los Angeles: UCLA Center for 7
Communication Policy, 2003.
 ACLU, Freedom of Expression in the Arts and Entertainment, 2017.8
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ultimately highlight the merit of the strategies of transgression. Dissent and objection to 
oﬀensive works and the debate they provoke is a more generative route to engagement 
with the diﬃcult topics that the transgressive works take up than censure and 
avoidance. More broadly, “Poetics of Transgression” is an argument being made in 
favor of “agonistic conflict” and debate about the oﬀensive over its repression. 

	 Transgression defines itself in opposition to mass culture and, following 
Bataille’s conception of transgression, it should be intertwined with a sense of 
liberation. More recently, however, what appears to be transgression’s energy, its 
tactics of shock, the irrational, degradation, unrestrained by any moral self-censure, 
has passed to the conservative far right, to the very church and state that transgression 
is meant to challenge. In this transition we have a paradox: transgression, or rather its 
tactics, are being allied to repression.

	 The transgressive is characterized by a perceived assault on rationality. Under 
the guise of a war on “political correctness,” the conservative right revels in insult and 
abuse. It breaches the taboos outlined by progressive culture, by the left, against 
homophobia, racism, misogyny, transphobia, ableism, and xenophobia. The tactics of 
disturbance may be the same, but the definitive feature of transgression, as I advocate 
for it, and as supported by agonistic conflict is that it oversteps and shocks to 
stimulate dialogue and to bring into clarity that which is under-articulated by the 
hegemonic order, not to obfuscate and uphold it. 

	 The contemporary right-wing culture of provocation has precisely the opposite 
aims: it uses shame and threat to close down space for expression and debate through 
what I more accurately frame as oﬀense, not transgression. Mere oﬀense as opposed 
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to transgression obfuscates and stifles dialogue in order to uphold the hegemonic 
order, whereas transgression instigates inquiry and makes demands of its viewer to 
engage with the ethical considerations of a work through provocation in order to 
question the current hegemonic order. Transgression plays an important role by 
subverting the dominant hegemony and by contributing to the construction of new 
perspectives.

	 Encounter with a transgressive work challenges viewers’ ethical assumptions by 
confronting them with radical diﬀerence, forcing viewers to reassess and articulate our 
ethical positions and assumptions in response to the oﬀense we feel. Transgression as 
a methodology, as opposed to mere oﬀense, is redeemed by its challenging of 
hegemony, serving the function of radical democracy. My use of transgression as 
opposed to oﬀense parallels Chantal Mouﬀe’s notion of agonistic conflict, which I 
reframe as transgression when agonistic conflict is facilitated in the specific context of 
contemporary art. I propose that the way aesthetic transgression has been defined art 
historically as an oppositional practice mirror’s Mouﬀe’s concept of agonistic conflict in 
its counter-hegemonic function. 

	 Although Mouﬀe takes up the institution of art as a setting for agonistic conflict, 
I employ her criteria for what constitutes agonistic conflict and her methodology in a 
more specified way in order to delineate the diﬀerence between transgression and 
mere oﬀense, looking more closely at specific artworks and their ability to challenge 
hegemony rather than discussing the institution of art at large. Where Mouﬀe proposes 
that agonistic conflict and a willingness to have our assumptions and positions 
challenged is essential to the maintenance of a radially free democracy, I similarly 
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propose that a transformation of the self occurs when encountering something 
radically diﬀerent from ourselves through transgressive artworks. Transgressive 
practices are the radical diﬀerence that challenges us in the context of contemporary 
art, and delineating the separation between oﬀense, which does not contribute to 
challenging hegemony, and transgression, which does succeed in challenging 
hegemony, sets apart oﬀensive works from transgressive works.

	 The first case study of this paper looks at the exhibition of Dana Schutz’s “Open 
Casket” at the 2017 Whitney Biennial. The “Open Casket” chapter outlines the nature 
of the work’s oﬀense as commodity racism  and considers the calls for destruction of 9
the work. Peter Lamarque’s notion of aesthetic transvaluation is applied to the work as 
a proposed alternative to destruction of the work, and Roger Simon’s thinking around 
curating diﬃcult knowledge is applied as a proposed alternative to censorship of the 
work.

	 The second case study looks at the controversy surrounding Artur Żmijewski’s 
“Berek,” which has been accused of not respecting the dignity of the victims of the 
Holocaust due to the insensitivity is displays towards its subject matter, and the work 
was eventually censored from view on two separate occasions. “Berek” is 
contextualized within Żmijewski’s larger artistic practice of antagonism and the merits 
of the artists’ antagonistic approach are explored through Chantal Mouﬀe’s thinking 
around agonistic politics and the essential role of conflict to democracy. 

 Commodity racism refers to the way in which racism finds its expression through 9
commodities. The concept was first proposed by McClintock, who argued that, from the late 
nineteenth century, racism encoded into commodities and their advertising campaigns was a 
key tool in the British project of colonization. Elizabeth Chin, “Commodity Racism” The Wiley 
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Consumption and Consumer Studies, 1, 2015, 1.
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	 The final case study looks at Renzo Martens’ cinematic work “Episode III,” 
which is controversial for denying its subjects respect or agency through the process of 
its making. Further, rather than simply represent injustice, Martens intentionally 
provokes and performs injustice precisely for consumption by Western audiences. The 
work is defended on the grounds that it oﬀers a lesson on the power of discomfort to 
disrupt unethical image practices. It is successful in disrupting an unethical image 
practice precisely because Martens refuses the feel-good approach that sustains aid 
photo regimes , by exposing, through provocation, the self-interest that underwrites 10
sentimental approaches to representing poverty. 

	 

 Sanne Sinnige, “Evidence, Subjectivity and Verité in Renzo Martens’ Episode III: Enjoy 10
Poverty – a Shot-By-Shot Analysis” IMAGE [&] NARRATIVE Vol. 18, No.2, 2017, 86.
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OPEN CASKET 
“People want the weight of witnessing without the taint of artistry, 
which is equated with insincerity or mere contrivance.”  
— Susan Sontag11
	 The first time I viewed Open Casket, unaware of the subject matter it addressed, 
I didn’t feel very much. The painting is an abstraction of a figure in aerial view. The 
work felt overwhelmingly flat, and I remember thinking that the abstraction of the 
figure’s face redacted the figure any intensity of personhood. My eye is drawn to the 
collar of the shirt, my attention lingers on its sterility. The flesh is blue, twisted, striped.

	 Dana Schutz’s Open Casket, a controversial painting on display at the 2017 
Whitney Biennial, depicted the mutilated body of Emmett Till, and the backlash against 
the work began even before the Whitney Biennial opened. “Who is the audience for this 
painting?” wrote artist Devin Kenny, wondering why this painting of black suffering by a 
white artist was going to be featured in the biennial. “What action is this work 
purportedly, and actually doing? Does it inform? Shock? Build connection? Help a new 
audience understand either emotionally or intellectually the complex set of factors all 
falling under the umbrella of white supremacy, sexism, and anti-blackness that led to 
this young person’s death?”  12
	 In the summer of 1955, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old boy, left his home in 
Chicago to spend some time in Mississippi with his great-uncle Mose Wright. On August 
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003) 23.11
 Lisa Larson-Walker, “The Problem With the Whitney Biennial’s Emmett Till Painting Isn’t That 12
the Artist Is White,” SLATE, March 2017, 4.
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24th, Till and his friends visited Bryant's Grocery & Meat Market to buy some 
bubblegum where Till had some kind of an interaction with Carolyn Bryant, a white 
woman and the market owner's wife. Early in the morning of August 28th, Carolyn's 
husband, Roy Bryant, and his brother J. W. Milam, abducted Till from his uncle's home. 
They beat him unconscious, they shot him in the head, they fastened a large metal fan 
to his neck with barbed wire, and they sank his body in the Tallahatchie River. On 
August 31st, Till's naked body was found floating in the river, the metal fan still attached 
to his neck.  13
When Till’s mother, Mamie Till-Mobley, came to identify her son, she told the 
funeral director, “Let the people see what I’ve seen.”  She made the decision to leave 14
the casket open at her son's funeral because she wanted the world to see the visceral 
brutality of lynching. For four days, tens of thousands of people came to view the 
remains of Emmett Till's body in a Chicago church. Jet magazine published David 
Jackson's photographs of Till’s face post mortem and his murder became international 
news that highlighted the violent racism of the Jim Crow South.15
On March 17, 2017, the opening day of the Whitney Biennial, dozens of 
protesters took turns standing in front of Schutz’s work to block it from view. The protest 
was organized by the artist Parker Bright, who wore a shirt that said "black death 
spectacle" as he stood in front of the piece. Artist Hannah Black published an open 
 Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning Emmett Louis Till, 1-50 (Federal Bureau of 13
Investigation February 9, 2006).
 “When One Mother Defied America: The Photo That Changed the Civil Rights Movement,” 14
TIME, July 10, 2016, 2.
 Jacqueline Goldsby, "The High and Low Tech of It: The Meaning of Lynching and the Death of 15
Emmett Till," Yale Journal of Criticism 9, no. 2 (1996): 82.
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letter addressed to the curators of the Whitney Biennial, in which she called for the 
destruction of the work, writing that “non-Black artists who sincerely wish to highlight the 
shameful nature of white violence cannot treat Black pain as raw material.” In the letter, 
Black expresses concerns around the work’s integration into the art market and the 
work’s subsequent valorization by it, writing that “even the disfigured corpse of a child 
was not sufficient to move the white gaze from its habitual cold calculation is evident 
daily and in a myriad of ways, not least the fact that this painting exists at all. In brief: 
the painting should not be acceptable to anyone who cares or pretends to care about 
Black people because it is not acceptable for a white person to transmute Black 
suffering into profit and fun, though the practice has been normalized for a long time.”  16
The request for the destruction of the painting is aimed at its existence as a commodity, 
but also as a site of pleasure. For Black the destruction of the work is the only way to 
ensure its inability to find a way into any market or museum, to be exchanged or 
accumulated. 
Schutz defended her work, saying it was “not a rendering of the photograph but 
is more an engagement with the loss, that “I don’t know what it is like to be black in 
America but I do know what it is like to be a mother.”  The ambiguity of this justification 17
was found inadequate by many audiences, considering the historical significance of 
Emmett Till's post-mortem photograph. Emmett Till’s name has circulated widely since 
his death. It has come to stand not only for Till himself but for the mournability of people 
 Alex Greenberger, “The Painting Must Go’: Hannah Black Pens Open Letter to the Whitney 16
About Controversial Biennial Work,” artNews, March 21, 2017, 3.
 Rachel Herron. Activists Call for the Immediate Removal of White Artist's Emmett Till Painting 17
for 'Transmuting Black Suffering Into Fun. BET, 2017, 2.
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marked as disposable, for the weight so often given to a white woman’s word above a 
Black child’s comfort or survival. It is arguably, this power imbalance continuing to 
proliferate through the exhibition of a black child’s death for the benefit of Dana Schutz's 
career.
In response to audiences calling for the removal of Open Casket from the 
Whitney Biannual, the curators Mia Locks and Christopher Lew wrote that, “by 
exhibiting the painting we wanted to acknowledge the importance of this extremely 
consequential and solemn image in American and African American history and the 
history of race relations in this country. The painting has tremendous emotional 
resonance, particularly for black viewers.”  But is “tremendous resonance” enough? 18
Resonance at what cost? And who’s paying it? There is a sort of cynicism to the 
justification of starting a conversation, because just how much of another’s sorrow and 
grief is a conversation worth? Is this risk calculable? Is it possible to defend a work like 
Open Casket in a way that vindicates its ambiguous ethical message?
Schutz is a painter with a history of approaching gory imagery with colorful 
ambiguity. Her figures are cartoonish and often invoke humor, and it’s exactly this 
detachment from Emmett Till’s very real, horrific death that viewers found so 
objectionable. In Lynching and Spectacle Amy Louise Wood argues that lynching 
photographs constructed and perpetuated white supremacist ideology by creating 
images of helpless and powerless black men. Does Open Casket not function similarly? 
There is a parallel between the disproportionate power dynamics of a renowned white 
artist creating images of a black child’s pain. The gesture seems to opportunistically 
 Lovia Gyarye and Josephine Livingstone, “The Case Against Dana Schutz," New Republic, 18
2017.
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utilize a brutalized black body in order to gain art critic approval. If those the painter 
wishes to depict are those whose historical and present-day experiences she is exempt 
from, can she accurately represent them?
Scholar Christina Sharpe contends in an interview, that the debate surrounding 
Open Casket is less about cultural appropriation and free speech, but rather about 
intimacy and our different relationships to violence. Sharpe calls our attention to the 
ways in which Schutz's painting works, when compared to the way that the photograph, 
published only in Jet magazine, functioned at the time: "Mamie Till Mobley makes the 
decision, against much advice, to have those photographs of her son published. It was 
not mainstream media - or white media - that published those images …They were for 
black people, because Jet was a black publication. They weren't meant to create 
empathy or shame or awareness from white viewers. They were meant to speak to and 
to move a Black audience.”19
Lisa Whittington’s How She Sent Him and How She Got Him Back (2012) 
memorialized Emmett Till four years prior to Open Casket. Whittington’s before-and-
after painting renders the total rupture in appearance that Till suffered, the doubled 
image his mother would have to confront upon his return. How She Sent Him and How 
She Got Him Back is about disfiguration and torment, the wide-eyed living half of Till’s 
face is juxtaposed with the half that is now torn beyond recognition. Careful, slow 
burning witness is the leitmotif of Whittington’s painting. In an interview about her work 
in relation to Open Casket, Whittington remarked: “The horror was too gentle in her 
work. She downplayed the details and the emotion his death represented. Looking at 
 Sharpe, Christina and Mitter Siddhartha. “What Does It Mean to Be Black and Look at This? A 19
Scholar Reflects on the Dana Schutz Controversy.” Hyperallergic, March 2017, 1. 
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her work, it feels like Emmett’s death was easy. Dana dressed him in a tux, put a flower 
on him, and she allows the viewer to close the casket and move on. Where is the 
artwork that interprets the lies that got Emmett Till killed? Where are the portraits of the 
men who lynched Emmett? What was in their eyes during the act of murder? What color 
is remorse? Does she have nothing to say there?”20
Open Casket is framed by Schutz as a gesture of interracial maternal empathy 
with Mamie Till-Mobley, but that does not extricate the artist from considerations of 
intersectionality. Unlike Schutz, Whittington creates a portrait more conducive to a 
meditation on loss. This kind of directed thought is not evident in Schutz’s rendering of 
Open Casket. The swirling multicolor of Till’s disfigured face feels unconnected to the 
immense historical weight and significance of this particular photograph. In choosing to 
alter the violent, physical distortions to Till's face, Schutz diffused the historical and 
political importance of Emmett Till’s open casket. That choice by Till’s mother to unveil 
the brutality of white supremacist violence in America is made weak by the omissions 
inherent to abstraction. The exhibition of Open Casket makes a spectacle of Till's death 
once more, only this time, in a context devoid of the respectful frameworks required for 
mourning.
The controversy surrounding the 2017 Whitney Biennial raises questions around 
commodity racism, the white gaze, and the limits of empathy. Taking the debate sparked 
by Schutz’s Open Casket as a starting point, viewers should engage with the topic of 
white supremacy in the art institution, holding the exhibition as an agent accountable for 
its activity. There is a legitimate frustration among viewers that a theme so central to 
 Lisa Whittington, “#MuseumsSoWhite: Black Pain and Why Painting Emmett Till Matters," 20
NBCBLK, March 2017, 3.
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black history should be explored, in a major institution, by a white artist. For Dana 
Schutz to represent Emmett Till in his casket communicates an ignorance of the role a 
white women’s narrative played in that murder and the way it cancelled out Till’s own 
voice/expression. Further, for curatorial authorship to ignore the artist’s positionality in 
relation to the subject matter she was working with conveys ignorance at best, and 
race-baiting opportunism at worst.
In the case of Open Casket and the calls for censorship of the work, the 
exhibition of the work and the role of curatorial authorship, seems to be its critically 
overlooked failure. Open Casket as it was presented at the 2017 Whitney Biennale 
failed to bear witness to the tragedy it indexed. The work’s abstraction detracted from 
the possibility of witness, leaving only empty spectacle in place of emotional closeness 
and witnessing. And if the work does not bear adequate witness to the tragedy of 
Emmett Till’s brutalization, instead aestheticizing it, then the making public of such a 
work does seem to amount to defamation and the erasure/disparaging of Black History. 
If the exhibition as a medium is an inherently implicated one, the question then 
becomes, can the making public of Open Casket by the Whitney Museum, be 
considered an unethical? Should the work be censored as requested? Does exposure 
to unethical image practices, ones that refuse respect or agency to their subjects, harm 
its viewers?
In “Tragedy and Moral Value” Peter Lamarque argues that violent works, by 
focusing on motifs with negative values such as moral failure and nihilistic cruelty, have 
the potential to elaborate on ethical themes through sublimation in the tragic. Part of the 
value of offensive art is in its aesthetic ability to express what Lamarque calls a 
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“metaphysical picture,”  which he argues posses its own independent moral 21
significance. To demonstrate how the aesthetic transvaluation of morality is affected 
through shock, revulsion, and outrage, Lamarque proposes a distinction between the 
internal and external aspects of an artwork. The internal is the immediate affective 
reaction to the work as it is being experienced. This involuntary response is seen, in 
relation to transgressive art, as moral outrage, disgust, shame, guilt, pity, etc. In terms of 
the initial experience, internal aspects of the work would be experienced by complete 
absorption in, and simultaneously in visceral repulsion from, the transgressive work in 
question. Yet this immediate visceral internal aspect is complemented by the external 
aspect of the work, which is a consequential, post-response to the work that follows, 
and is dependent on the earlier initial reaction. 
Lamarque suggests that we can come to appreciate, in hindsight, the same work 
that provoked an initial visceral reaction of contempt. The work appears as expressive 
of a meta-ethical narrative that transcends, and Lamarque suggests ultimately justifies, 
the specific immoralities responsible for the immediate reaction of repulsion and shock. 
The major aspect of the work is revealed in hindsight, by gradual release, transcending 
the immediate immorality associated. It comes to light through Lamarque’s “external 
aspect’”  that cancels and transcends the immediate immorality associated with the 22
work. This results in a re-evaluation of the merit of the work as a whole, and for 
Lamarque the principle characteristic of the external aspect is precisely the questioning 
of the emotional response associated with the initial immediate reaction. 
 Lamarque, Peter “Tragedy and moral value” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1995, 275. 21
 Ibid.22
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For Lamarque, what matters more than the immediate transgressions of a work 
is the experience of considering our own ethical position in relation to the subject matter 
that repulses us. Offense, revulsion and shock elicit a sympathetic response and moral 
themes are paradoxically rendered more abrupt, urgent and intensely felt through our 
evaluation of our reactions. In the specific case of Open Casket, without experiencing 
an offense to the historical insensitivity it displays, how would we know we value 
historical sensitivity? Even if Open Casket is an ethical failure and a violent work, is 
silent repression through censorship, or destruction of the work, the most conducive 
response? Without the emotional experience of recoiling from Schutz’s mistreatment of 
Emmett Till’s memory, how would we as viewers know what we stand for? Lamarque 
ultimately makes the argument that the process of offense is fundamental to the ethical 
experience, that anger sensitizes us to the emotional life of others. Moral conduct 
requires that we see the world as others see it, and this requires that we strive for 
emotional connectedness, anger and indignation included. However, the burden does 
fall on contemporary art institutions who choose to display transgressive work to put into 
place the conditions that make it possible to experience rage, offense, and tragedy in an 
environment conducive to directed thought and dialogue. If not in our institutions of 
pedagogy, then where?
All of the aforementioned thinking ultimately brings us to the question of, what 
does it mean to exhibit a violent artwork successfully, so that viewers might bear witness 
to the actualities of suffering? In A Pedagogy of Witnessing Roger Simon discusses 
artworks in direct complicity with the violence they index. Simon focuses on how those 
responsible for presenting such exhibitions have reframed the work so that they 
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functioned to contest the very unethical purpose for which they were made. Simon 
suggests that successful exhibition of a difficult work must always be understood as 
essentially connected to the event of its appearance, an event that always occurs in the 
world. The force of the work comes from its capacity to touch viewers who feel, rather 
than simply see, the events depicted. Further, the force of an artwork has less to do with 
the experience of seeing something in it that moves us, but rather the feeling that, in 
looking at a work, one experiences a sense of being seen. Successful exhibition of a 
difficult work will compel us to reflect on our own role in the conditions (of the event) of 
the work’s creation. Affect works on us not just as a felt loss, but as an uninvited, felt 
responsibility that one cannot remain indifferent when faced with the pain of another.
Simon warns curators that every exhibition takes on the risk of reenacting 
symbolic violence and re-presenting pain. He describes this risk as the problem of 
undirected emotions, affect provoked without anywhere to go, a directionless 
disturbance, “characterized by a dark complex of sentimentality and superiority.”  23
Meaningful engagement with violent works forces us to confront our own positionality 
and agency in the world, and if applicable, bearing witness to violence forces us to 
acknowledge the privileges of the identities we hold. For Simon, it is precisely this 
abandonment of thought that constitutes the risk assumed when exhibiting the painful.
In “Difficult exhibitions and intimate encounters” Roger Simon elaborates on this 
point further, considering what it is about exhibitions that render them ‘difficult’ and, 
more importantly, what can be achieved by making painful histories public. Particularly 
relevant to the Open Casket case study is Simon’s proposition that museums function 
 Roger Simon. A Pedagogy of Witnessing, Curatorial Practice and the Pursuit of Social Justice. 2014, 23
SUNY Press, 46. 
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as institutions of social memory with a potential public role in constituting what members 
of any given society understand as their cultural heritage. Simon encourages curators to 
create exhibitions that go beyond knowledge acquisition and admiration of what is 
institutionally presented as valuable heritage, but rather “needed are practices of social 
memory that conceive of cultural inheritance as a process requiring the commitment to 
critically engage a past that is both inspiring and despairing.”  Two central concepts 24
inform Simon’s discussion: first, the notion that difficult exhibitions at times render a 
burdensome gift, a demand of the viewer that contains within it the expectation of an 
empathic response; and second, the notion of the intimate encounter: an exhibition 
experience which offers visitors the potential for insight that may support new ways of 
relating with and within the world around them. 
Simon distinguishes the difficult exhibition from one that has merely been 
deemed controversial. Simon frames the controversial exhibition as one that provokes 
serious public disagreements about the adequacy and accuracy of an exhibits narrative 
and interpretative frame. In addition to issues of adequacy and accuracy, these 
disagreements have also focused on the exclusions enacted by an exhibition, the ethics 
of exhibiting particular objects, or even the legitimacy of holding an exhibition in the first 
place. Beyond its potential for controversy, what is meant by the difficult exhibit as 
Simon presents it, is difficulty understood as an aspect of visitor experience that 
implicates both cognitive and affective aspects of that experience. One way an 
exhibition might be said to be difficult is if visitors undergo significant challenges to their 
interpretive abilities. A difficult exhibition is experienced as “eliciting the burden of 
 Bonnell, Jennifer and Simon, Roger. “Difficult exhibitions and intimate encounters” museum and 24
society, July 2007. 5(2) 2007, 65-85.
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‘negative emotions’, those unpleasant feelings of grief, anger, shame, or horror that 
histories can produce, particularly if they raise the possibility of complicity of one’s 
country, culture, or family in systemic violence”  such as the seizure of aboriginal land, 25
the slave trade, or the perpetration of genocide. Difficult exhibitions evoke a heightened 
anxiety that accompanies feelings of identification with the victims of violence as well as 
the perpetrators of that violence.
“Difficult exhibitions and intimate encounters” culminates in the conclusion that 
what might be experienced as difficult subject matter does not rest with particular 
objects nor the events to which they refer. Rather, the experience of difficulty “resides in 
the efforts to make meaning that are constituted in the relationship between a visitor 
and the material presented in an exhibit, a relationship that is always specifically 
contextualized,” which seems to me, to fall onto the curator/curatorial authorship rather 
than the artist. When discussing difficult exhibitions, the curatorial question that must be 
asked and addressed with consideration is: difficult for whom? While experience of 
difficulty will vary with factors such as time and place, gender and generation, political 
orientation or ethnic and/or national background, Simon urges curators to embrace the 
complex, conflict-ridden, and tragic spectrum of human history. Difficult exhibitions 
should strive to convey the message that a painful, unredeemed history must be 
confronted in ways that support a hopeful future while simultaneously teaching humility 
in the face of the unpredictability of life. Behind this argument is the assumption that if 
museums present exhibitions that tell troubling stories that have been systemically 
ignored and/or willfully forgotten, and do so in a way that is emotionally engaging and 
 Ibid.25
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elicits empathy for others, this will enrich the consideration of civic life in our 
communities and nation. The challenge is to design exhibitions to support visitors in the 
recognition that a difficult exhibition implicates the self in the practice of coming to terms 
with the substance and significance of history. 
Open Casket presents a unique challenge to the categorization of an art work as 
either offensive or transgressive. It is offensive because of its commodity racism, but the 
work is also ambiguous enough in its aesthetic presentation that it doesn’t predetermine 
an ethical response from its viewers, because of this, the work was able to facilitate the 
kind of agonistic conflict that Mouffe advocates for as an unanticipated consequence to 
its exhibition in a major institution. It is undeniable that the controversy surrounding its 
exhibition facilitated a robust conversation around white supremacy and commodity 
racism in the art institution. Because of its critical reception by audiences, I found this 
work difficult to categorize as either offensive or transgressive. 
Open Casket has the potential to be reframed as transgressive as opposed to 
merely offensive if the work were to be presented differently curatorially. As Simon 
proposes, there are ways to engage with objects that are complicit in the violence they 
index, if through curatorial strategies these works can be reframed to counter the 
violence they index, and to challenge the hegemonic order. However, if we are 
considering the work as it stood at the 2017 Whitney Biennale through the lens of 
agonistic conflict, Open Casket ends up reinforcing hegemonic racism.
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BEREK
“Just the provocation: can you look at this?”  
— Susan Sontag26
The opening shot of Artur Żmijewski’s 1999 video installation Berek or Game of 
Tag films nude men and women, hesitantly filing into an empty concrete basement. The 
film takes place in two rooms. The first is a concrete basement, the second, is the gas 
chamber of a former Nazi concentration camp, Stutthof. 65,000 people were killed in the 
confines of this space using Zyklon-B and the yellow-blue stains left by the gas can still 
be seen on the walls. Some of the participants convey hesitation and uncertainty 
through their body language as they slowly enter the room, they make modest gestures 
to cover their nudity from the camera with their hands. Others convey confidence 
straightaway, they swing their arms from side to side, roll on the balls of their feet, and 
hop around in small strides in an effort to warm themselves up.
In the next shot, quite suddenly, the participants are seen playing, they chase 
after one another and laugh often. Nothing about their behavior conveys to the viewer 
that they are encumbered by the discomfort of the setting any longer. As they run in 
circles and touch one another, all are animated. The participants are filmed engaged in 
play for 4 minutes and 29 seconds. The work begins without preface and ends with no 
afterward, viewers are left ambivalent about the context in which the work was made, 
being informed only of the location of its making. Żmijewski, when describing Game of 
Tag, ascribes a ‘therapeutic’ character to the situation: that “certain events from the Nazi 
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003) 34.26
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era were repeated, with only the ending changed: Visually, there was a strong similarity 
between the two situations. But this time nothing bad happened. Instead of tragedy, 
we're watching innocent, childish play. This resembles a clinical situation in 
psychotherapy. You return to the traumas that brought about your complex. You 
recreate them, almost like in theatre.”  Żmijewski’s description of the work has a 27
manipulating ethical ambiguity to it: he compares it to a psychotherapeutic clinical 
setting, as though he is hinting that he intends the work serve as a sort of abreactive 
therapy  for viewers traumatized by the Holocaust, but he is simultaneously not offering 28
anything resembling responsibility or ownership over the work’s effect on viewers. Also, 
he does not identify any professional credentials that could legitimate the administration 
of this sort of psychotherapeutic experience to unsuspecting audiences. 
Throughout his practice Żmijewski has repeatedly touched on Poland’s 
Holocaust history. For the video installation 80064 (2004) Żmijewski persuades Jozef 
Tarnawa, a ninety-two-year-old Auschwitz survivor, to have the fading tattoo of his 
prisoner number reapplied on his arm. The film begins by Żmijewski himself engaging 
Jozef in a conversation about Jozef’s memories and recollections of Auschwitz. The 
onset of the film serves to build a familiarity with Jozef and the details of his memories 
help viewers align themselves with viewing the film from Jozef’s perspective. From the 
 “If it happened only once it’s as if it never happened,” Kunsthalle Basel 2005 exhibition 27
catalogue, 152.
 In psychoanalysis, abreaction refers to reliving an experience to purge it of its emotional 28
excesses. The concept was first introduced by Sigmund Freud in 1893 to denote the fact that 
repressed emotions associated with a trauma can be brought into focus and discharged 
through talking about them. However, Żmijewski’s reference to “the clinical situation in 
psychotherapy” is not harmonious with Freud’s practice and application of abreactive therapy, 
which focused on considering the emotions associated with trauma rather than a “reliving” of 
the traumatic scenario itself. Salman Akhtar, ed. Comprehensive dictionary of psychoanalysis. 
London: Karnac Books, 2009. 1.
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conversation, the viewer is able to gather that Jozef had agreed beforehand to have the 
tattoo reapplied, but on film he is seen having changed his mind, and is pleading not to 
have the tattoo reapplied. Żmijewski begins to persuade Jozef, there is a back and forth 
between the two that intensifies until Jozef eventually surrenders to Żmijewski’s 
heckling. The tattooist begins to retrace Jozef’s 80064 and here the most effecting, 
disturbing, and implicating part of the film ensues as the deafeningly loud sound of the 
tattoo gun dominates the film’s soundtrack. The framing of the shot focuses on Jozef but 
is slightly out of focus so that the viewers’ attention shifts to the auditory stimulation 
emitting from the work rather than the visual image. The sound of the tattoo gun rings 
overwhelmingly loud for 73 particularly difficult, implicating seconds. Immediately 
afterward, Jozef conveys no discernible reaction to the reapplication. The final 
resolution to the work is, again, just open-ended enough to be received by the viewer as 
a sense of confusion as to the artists’ intention.
Żmijewski similarly describes 80064 as an experiment with memory, that he 
expected “under the effect of the tattooing the ‘doors of memory’ would open, that there 
would be an eruption of remembrance of that time, a stream of images or words 
describing the painful past.”  If the viewer is generous, reapplying the number could be 29
interpreted as a metaphor about memory and history, that we cannot forget 
catastrophes of cruelty and dehumanization, or similar events are bound to happen 
again. Other viewers, not as generous with the moral ambiguity of Żmijewski’s practice, 
may not find this attempt to engage with the past justification enough for what could be 
seen as elder abuse.
 80064. International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam. Accessed February 13, 2018. 29
<https://www.idfa.nl/en/film/e42b89be-9d61-4934-b12b-19cf72988d95/80064>
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Żmijewski is again playing at working through trauma but offers nothing concrete 
by way of a commitment to it, and this unwillingness to take authorship over the 
reception of either work is the most transgressive feature of Żmijewski’s practice. The 
ambiguity of the artist’s intent introduces and produces a moral problem, the work is 
transgressive precisely because it remains so unforthcoming about the issues that the 
work itself will provoke. Both Game of Tag and 80064 neither celebrate nor condemn, 
like other quintessentially transgressive artworks, they merely present and transfer the 
responsibility of deciding the meaning of the work (and how it is to be judged) onto the 
viewer. In this regard, Żmijewski’s antagonistic approach is a transgressively mute one. 
It makes no statements and it solves no problems; it simply presents a difficult reality 
and leaves it there as a confrontation to the viewer. The works stand at a distance from 
the response they elicit. This restraint is an important feature of transgressive art; this 
structure of undecidability is an indication of the noncommittal attitude of transgressive 
artists. The works suggests no possibility that the artist is implicated in what he 
criticizes.
Both projects have for years been accused of taking the Holocaust lightly, having 
been  shown at museums in Germany, Poland, and Estonia, where they were 
consistently met with protest. In 2012,  Game of Tag was censored from the Martin-
Gropius-Bau Side by Side: Poland–Germany. 1000 Years of Art and History exhibition in 
Berlin. The director, Gereon Sievernich, said Żmijewski was guilty of “not respecting the 
dignity of the victims of the Holocaust.”  Most recently, Game of Tag was screened at 30
the Museum of Contemporary Art in Kraków as part of a temporary exhibition on the 
 Marek Bartelik and Liam Kelly, “Censorship of ’Berek’ by Artur Żmijewski, at the Martin-30
Gropius-Bau,” International Association of Art Critics, January 2012.
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Holocaust, called Poland – Israel – Germany: The Experience of Auschwitz where it 
was again met with protest and censorship. Jonathan Ornstein, the executive director of 
the Jewish Community center in Krakow said that survivor groups contacted him  to 
request the removal of the work from view: “They feel that it shows a lack of respect for 
the victims, that it is not necessary and that it takes the Holocaust lightly.”  Maria Anna 31
Potocka, who directs the Museum of Contemporary Art in Krakow, said in response to 
the calls for censorship that the museum "only wants to awaken the young generation’s 
empathy with the tragedy of the Holocaust by stirring their imagination.”  In response to 32
complaints from the World Jewish Congress and Israel’s Holocaust Museum, the work 
was placed behind an enclosure with a warning to its controversial content.
The censorship of Żmijewski’s work raises important questions around art’s 
capacity to represent difficulty. What sort of justifications can be made for the role of 
offense and antagonism in Żmijewski’s practice? Does the transgression of his work 
enable audiences to access repressed neuroses and become psychologically enriched 
by the process? In Artshock Jake Chapman argues that post-holocaust society, altered 
irrevocably by the obscenities witnessed during two world wars, now suffers from a kind 
of global traumatic neurosis. Referring to the Freudian theory of repression, Chapman 
proposes that contemporary art emerged in the aftermath of the second world war as a 
kind of public abreactive therapy, where confrontation with trauma is assumed to result 
in a kind of beneficial catharsis for the neurotic. Chapman claims that, as shock is used 
 Vida Weisblum, “Zmijewski’s Video of a Game of Tag in a Nazi Gas Chamber Sparks Protests 31
in Poland, Abroad” ArtNews, July 2015.
 Jonathan Zalman, “GAS CHAMBER ‘GAME OF TAG’ VIDEO INSTALLATION CONTINUES TO 32
RILE AT KRAKOW MUSEUM” Tablet Magazine, July 2015.
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for positive ends in psychoanalytic therapy, so contemporary art tries to shock society 
out of its paralyzing hysteria by cruelly confronting it with de-sublimated  transgressive 33
imagery. As “80064” suggests, to face a problem means to return to the source of the 
pain and relive the state in which you received your formative injury. I find Chapman’s 
position that transgressive art results in beneficial catharsis difficult to either contest or 
defend, so I defer to giving it the benefit of the doubt. “80064” clearly conveys this 
confrontation with cruelty described by Chapman, but as a viewer I’m left with feelings 
of resounding discomfort, recoiling from the transgressions I saw unfolding before me, 
not relief.
“In Choosing Not to Look” Susan Crane considers the implications of access to 
Holocaust imagery, making the argument that images of Holocaust atrocity have 
created a sense of familiarity with the Holocaust and that may prevent, rather than 
facilitate, engagement with the historical subject.  Crane argues for the censorship of 34
Holocaust imagery, writing that “when it comes to atrocity images, the violence 
perpetrated on the victim is redoubled through the faithfulness of the camera to the 
horrors it is used to witness.”  Posing the question: how do we responsibly face, as 35
complicit viewers, the possibility that viewing atrocity imagery revives the perpetrator's 
 In psychoanalysis, sublimation is referred to as a type of defense mechanism, in which 33
socially unacceptable impulses are unconsciously transformed into socially acceptable 
behaviors. However, Chapman’s use of “shock” in this way is incorrect. Chapman’s 
understanding of psychoanlaysis is not harmonious with Freud, but rather, his ideas are 
reflective of a certain incorrect popularization of Freud’s theory and practice. Salman Akhtar, 
ed. Comprehensive dictionary of psychoanalysis. London: Karnac Books, 2009. 277.
 Susan A. Crane, "Choosing Not to Look: Representation, Repatriation, and Holocaust 34
Atrocity Photography," History and Theory 47, no. 3 (October 2008) Wiley for Wesleyan 
University, 309-330.
 Ibid, 311.35
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gaze, re-enacting dehumanization and terrorizing of the victim? Crane is questioning the 
premise that pain immortalized through imagery communicates universally. If viewers 
can look at images with detached historical interest, then, Cranes suggests, perhaps we 
should not be looking. Although Crane is thinking about photographs made in direct 
complicity with the violence they index, her insight into the problem of looking with 
“detached historical interest”  is applicable to Żmijewski’s antagonistic approach, 36
because the one thing viewers are not when encountering Game of Tag or 80064 is 
indifferent to the historical subject. Both works facilitate an emotionally charged 
engagement with the past, through the offense and the recoil at the insensitivity it 
provokes. 
Crane proposes choosing not to look rather than to look with disinterest. This is 
premised around the question of: are we better off in any moral or ethical sense for our 
exposure to Holocaust atrocity imagery? For Crane, the answer lies entirely in 
determining the nature of the gaze of the viewer. The “Nazi gaze,” as Crane describes 
it, produced imagery intended to be shared among non-sympathetic viewers: the 
imagined audience/gaze excluded the victims themselves or their relatives, or anyone 
who would be sympathetic with their suffering. “The photographers would have 
assumed that the gaze upon the victims would never be returned, that the reciprocity 
implied in being looked upon and looking back was impossible in this specific historical 
moment. These are the hallmarks of Nazi criminality, the dehumanization of the victims 
rendering them incapable of returning the gaze of their persecutors.”  The gaze, in 37
 Ibid, 313.36
 Ibid, 318.37
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other words, is shaped interactively within the social, cultural, and historical context of 
sharing images, and the meanings associated with difficult imagery form within 
collective memories. If the gaze of the viewer is historically constructed then the atrocity 
image's power resides in dialogical, interactive viewing. 
Crane concludes that the meanings of the past are our responsibility, and that 
they are perpetually renegotiated with each engagement. With each reading of a text, 
new memories and meanings are always being generated, and old ones are 
exchanged. If Crane’s criteria for choosing to look consists of engaged, as opposed to 
disinterested historical looking; a gaze that facilitates humanization of the victims; a 
sympathizing with their suffering; and a renegotiation of history from the perspective of 
the present; then Żmijewski’s antagonistic approach, which consistently incites feelings 
of self-implication, indignation, anger, and refusal from its viewers, seems to exemplify 
this renewal of the past advocated by Crane. 
Building upon Crane’s thinking, Theodor Adorno is also helpful in thinking about 
how, if at all, the Holocaust should be represented artistically. In “Cultural Criticism and 
Society” Adorno stated that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.”  Adorno 38
criticizes work that attempts to respond to the Holocaust too directly by transforming 
historical suffering into an ‘image’ and turning victims into a work of art. Adorno is 
against aesthetic representation that contains “however distantly, the possibility that 
pleasure can be squeezed out of it.”  39
 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans Samuel and Shierry 38
Weber, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1981, 34. 
 Ibid, 86. 39
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The ethical claim being made by Adorno is that any aesthetic representation of 
atrocity will carry within it this potential for aesthetic pleasure, and that the mere 
possibility of such a redeeming transfiguration does an injustice to the victims, for it 
makes the unthinkable appear to make sense. Instead, Adorno re-conceptualizes the 
possibility for art to represent violence negatively, in a way that intently prevents the 
extraction of any aesthetic pleasure or meaning. Adorno’s ethic of representation is an 
art that empties out all possibility of pleasure and, which at the same time, limits itself to 
negative and indirect evocations of violence.  40
Where Żmijewski’s use of antagonism to address the topic of the Holocaust falls 
within the prescribed confines of Adorno’s ethics of representation is difficult to pinpoint. 
Żmijewski’s practice revolves around the instigation and recording of difficult situations. 
In themselves, these records make no pretense to artistic form. Instead they direct 
attention to the events they record and the bodily experiences evoked by those events. 
In this sense, the bodies filmed are the primary medium through which Żmijewski 
meditates on agency, history, and trauma. Rather than turning historical suffering into an 
image with a linear narrative, Żmijewski creates discomfort for the viewer by subverting 
viewer expectations contextually. The historical contextual framework surrounding 
Game of Tag and 80064 are absolutely essential to activating the works, as are viewer 
expectations for how the Holocaust should be repatriated and memorialized. The 
potential of Żmijewski’s approach to be harmonious with Adorno’s thinking lies precisely 
in his provocation and readiness to incorporate cruelty and conflict into his work, and to 
expose already existing assumptions by challenging them and stirring up controversy. 
 Gene Ray, "Mirroring Evil: Auschwitz, Art and the ‘War on Terror’” Third Text, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 40
2003, 113–125.
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When Adorno refers to negation, the negating work that he speaks of refuses to "work 
through" trauma, and it’s unclear whether or not Żmijewski claims to. Ultimately, 
Żmijewski’s practice is validated or invalidated by Adorno’s ethics of representation 
depending on how direct or indirect the viewer finds his references to the Holocaust. 
References to the Holocaust, however indirect, that attempt to aestheticize and 
articulate an experience of trauma that is inarticulable, are precisely the type of thing 
that Adorno can't abide, as Adorno champions dissonance. However, I do maintain that 
Żmijewski practice is validated by Adorno’s ethics of representation because of its ability 
to ‘empty out all possibility of pleasure’ from its viewers, leaving tension in place of 
enjoyment, while simultaneously limiting his works to indirect evocations of and 
references to violence.
Żmijewski's antagonistic strategy continues to enjoy visibility in contemporary art 
spaces, but given the controversy they incite, how can his works be productively 
incorporated into a socially transformative conversation? Thinking about antagonism as 
a methodology more broadly and structurally, in “Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces” 
Chantal Mouffe advocates for the positive aspects of antagonism and conflict, 
advocating for conflict as essential to the articulation of boundaries in politics. Mouffe 
argues that a fully functioning democratic society is not one in which all conflicts have 
dissipated, but one in which boundaries are constantly being renegotiated and brought 
into debate, one in which relations of conflict are sustained mutually and with respect for 
radical difference, not erased. 
Conflict is framed by Mouffe as “articulatory practices through which a certain 
order is established. Every hegemonic order is susceptible to being challenged by 
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counter-hegemonic practices that will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to 
install another form of hegemony.”  This process is what Mouffe calls the agonistic 41
struggle, and it is a struggle between opposing positions which can never be fully 
reconciled rationally. For Mouffe, conflict is an ever present possibility of the ethical and 
the political and this requires coming to terms with the instability and imperfection which 
pervades every order. It requires recognizing that every order, its ethics and social 
contracts, are products of a series of social practices endlessly transgressing their own 
boundaries in order to renegotiate them. 
This abstract conception of the agonistic struggle can be brought back to the 
contemporary arts and paralleled to the practice of transgression: according to Mouffe 
and the agonistic approach, “critical art is art that foments dissensus, that makes visible 
what the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate. It is constituted by a 
manifold of artistic practices aiming at giving a voice to all those who are silenced within 
the framework of the existing hegemony.”  In other words, the arts are where the 42
‘agonistic struggle’ takes place, where what is legible and possible is constantly up for 
interpretation and renegotiation. Critical art is at liberty to offend if, through its 
transgressions, it makes visible and is able to articulate the under-articulated. Mouffe’s 
conception of conflict as an endless negotiation among radically antithetical interests 
and ethics manages to vindicate the most transgressive artistic practices. To grasp the 
political dimension and possibilities of transgression requires a willingness to prioritize 
 Chantal Mouﬀe, “Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces” Art & Research, Volume 1, Number 41
2, Summer 2007, 4.
 Ibid, 5.42
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the role transgression plays in the hegemonic struggle, over its immediate offenses and 
transgressions.
Żmijewski’s Game of Tag also poses challenges to its categorization between 
offense and transgression. The aesthetic work itself is much more overly offensive and 
antagonistic than Open Casket but again, there is just enough ambiguity in the content 
that the onus is really put on the viewer to decide whether or not it victimizes its 
subjects, or if it trivializes the suffering of the Holocaust. The work pressurizes the 
viewer to make sense of the offense they feel, to disentangle and resolve their feelings, 
which seems to engage the audience in agonistic conflict.
If Adorno’s criteria for ethical representation of the Holocaust is that no pleasure 
be derived from the work upon its viewing and that the topic of genocide not be 
aestheticized pleasurably, then Zmijewski’s aggressive approach is seemingly 
harmonious with Adorno’s ethics of representation. Crane, similar to Adorno, argues that 
exposure to historic Holocaust imagery desensitizes us to the atrocity it indexes. Our 
engagement with historic atrocity imagery cannot be through a disinterested gaze. A 
more meaningful engagement with the past for Crane would be to do so from the 
perspective of the contemporary, by engaging with the past through the present. If 
Crane’s criteria for a meaningful engagement with Holocaust history involves an 
engaged (as opposed to a disinterested) gaze, and empathy with the subjects, then 
Żmijewski’s work seemingly accomplishes this. Żmijewski’s audiences are anything but 
disinterested when viewing his works, and Żmijewski’s meditation upon the traumatic 
past is indirectly invoked using the contemporary moment.
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Game of Tag is transgressive as opposed to offensive in so far as we agree that 
the work passes the criteria set out by Adorno and Crane. The onus is put on the viewer 
to decide if the work is offensive or transgressive. Either the work evokes anti-semitism 
from audiences, in which case it would be an offensive work, or the work evokes 
outrage at anti-semitic sentiment, in which case it would be transgressive.
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EPISODE III
“So far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence.” 
— Susan Sontag43
Exemplifying Mouffe’s agonistic struggle is Dutch artist Renzo Martens in the 
cinematographic work Episode III (2008) (alternatively titled Enjoy Poverty). The film 
follows Martens' activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the course of 
two years and the project has been met with a decade of scrutiny  and a petition to 44
have Martens United Nations press credentials revoked.  Art critics have criticized the 45
film for perpetuating the very thing it was protesting against, such as the vicarious 
pleasures of watching other people in dangerous situations and a reductive stereotyping 
of the Congolese.  46
Itself a documentary, Episode III satirizes documentation of poverty in Africa. It 
challenges viewer assumptions as it refuses to sentimentalize poverty, and exposes the 
ways in which consumers of poverty images enjoy such images as commodities. By 
enacting the very regimes of exploitation that it criticizes, Episode III intentionally aims 
 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003) 43
102. 
 Critical publications on Episode III include Matthias de Groof, “Reexieve ethiek in Renzo 44
Martens’ ‘Episode III’ (Enjoy Poverty)”, Ethische Perspectieven, 2015, 243-251; Caitlin Frances 
Bruce, “Episode III: Enjoy Poverty, An Aesthetic Virus of Political Discomfort,” Communication, 
Culture & Critique 9, 2016, 284-302; and Nicola Perugini & Francesco Zucconi, “Enjoy Poverty: 
Humanitarianism and the Testimonial Function of Images”, Visual Studies 32, 2017, 24-32. 
 A direct reference to this is made in the film. Episode III: Enjoy Poverty dir. Renzo Martens, 45
2008, http://www.enjoypoverty.com.
 Episode III is critiqued by Dan Fox in “Renzo Martens” frieze magazine, Issue 122, April, 46
2009; Paul O’Kane in “Renzo Martens, Episode III”, Third Text 23, 2009, 815; and Eunsong Kim 
in “Art & Colonialism: Renzo Martens Part 1” contemptorary, 2016.
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to make viewers uncomfortable in an effort to render more visible the power structures 
of humanitarian journalism and the images it sells as commodities. The film establishes 
at its outset that images of poverty are the Congo’s most lucrative export, generating 
more revenue than gold, diamonds, or cocoa combined. Viewers of the film follow 
Martens to various locations: refugee camps, coffee and cocoa plantations, gold and oil 
prospecting ventures, an art gallery, and a World Bank meeting, each illuminating 
different facets of structural poverty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Martens 
performs a variety of personas over the course of the film, moving from colonizer to 
ethnographer to entrepreneur, in an attempt to further clarify the operations of global 
capital in its varied roles.
In the first half of the film, crossing an area visibly marked by conflict, with 
numerous corpses visible on the ground, a discussion ensues between Martens and 
other reporters, and Martens is seen asking them about their work. The only stories 
considered of any interest are ones with negative elements, explains a freelance 
photographer, “Usually it has to be a disaster or a humanitarian crisis. Dead people.” 
“But it’s not me,’ the reported clarifies, “It’s supply and demand. It’s a market out there.” 
Martens is then seen asking another journalist about the ownership of humanitarian 
photographs. “I own them.” “And the people in the pictures? The people you have 
photographed… are they owners of the pictures too?” asks Martens, “Those you 
photographed own nothing?” “No, because I took the pictures,” replies the freelance 
photographer.  47
 Episode III: Enjoy Poverty dir. Renzo Martens, 2008, http://www.enjoypoverty.com.47
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Martens consistently frames his shots of the reporters from behind so as not to 
adopt their point of view. By doing so, Martens creates an antagonistic tension between 
the viewer and the journalists through the framing of the camera, turning his lens onto 
the reporters as the subjects of his gaze and scrutiny. As Martens’ interviewees admit, 
witnesses to crisis and the images they produce are unabashedly influenced by the 
formal canons that regulate the market for images of suffering. The film makes an 
important connection between, on the one hand, images of suffering and poverty, and 
on the other, the financial mechanisms and humanitarian organizations that reproduce 
that poverty. These relations implicate Western viewers who, as citizens of privileged 
nations, benefit from this international arrangement. 
In the second half of the film, Martens continues his analysis of the Congolese 
economy of suffering by shifting his focus from the Western reporters and their labor, to 
the Congolese represented in their photographs. Here, he attempt to address how those 
objectified by humanitarian photojournalism might begin to articulate their own gaze. 
Martens sets up an “emancipation program”  that aims to teach the poor how to benefit 48
from their poverty. Martens is filmed persuading Congolese photographers to move 
away from photographing community celebrations, such as weddings and parties, to 
instead begin taking images of the suffering in their communities. “Who owns poverty?” 
Martens asks the local Congolese photographers. Or in other words, why continue to 
take pictures at family gatherings, if the documentation of abject suffering, of which the 
Congolese people are the more rightful owners, could earn the photographers ten times 
 Ibid.48
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as much?  After the impact of these questions, the next sequence in the film shows the 49
Congolese photographers attempt at documenting members of their community at their 
most vulnerable. Martens can be seen advising the Congolese photographers on how 
they should shoot the jutting ribs of a malnourished child to make the picture formally 
attractive to Western media. Martens is seen intervening, suggesting the compositions 
most likely to tug at the heartstrings of Westerns viewers. 
Viewers are forced to witness how the local Congolese photographers are 
provoked by Martens to produce the images of poverty that we Western viewers see 
every day in newspapers, on television, and in our individualized social media 
newsfeeds. We see at what disturbing cost these images are made. Further, the 
antagonistic approach to the filmmaking of Episode III reveals at what cost this film is 
made, and watching it offers no redemption. In Martens own words: “Episode III doesn’t 
critique by showing something that is bad, it critiques by duplicating what may be bad ... 
So, the critique in the film is the film as a whole ... In this film, it is not the subject that is 
tragic, like poverty in Africa, it is the very way that the film deals with the subject that is 
tragic.”  The transgression of Martens’ film lies in its exploitation of its subjects, one 50
that mirrors the exploitative relations of power between the Congo and the West. 
Episode III is intended to demoralize, to incite discomfort, anger, and refusal in the 
viewer. Painful watching is linked to a kind of witnessing. 
Martens characterizes this discomfort as a demystification. He is skeptical of the 
potential of showing the suffering and pain of others in images because it “creates a 
 Episode III: Enjoy Poverty dir. Renzo Martens, 2008, http://www.enjoypoverty.com.49
 T.J. Demos, “Toward a New Institutional Critique: A Conversation with Renzo Martens” 50
Ethics, Documents of Contemporary Art, The MIT Press, 2015, 171.
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fantasy link between the faraway sufferers and the privileged viewer that is simply 
untrue.”  For Martens, sympathy masks the viewers’ agency in the role of causing 51
suffering, putting off a reflection on how “our privileges are located on the same maps 
as their suffering.”  By inciting discomfort, anger, and frustration Episode III disrupts the 52
economies of sympathy that Martens argues sustain Western complacency.
Without taking an explicit position against the exploitation that the film 
reproduces, the film unfolds as itself a point of critique. Devoid of empathy, Episode III 
repeatedly denies its subjects either respect or agency in its representation of them. 
The film copies, in itself, the modes of exploitation that are also the film’s subject matter, 
and unfolds them for all to see and feel. Martens’ provocative framing of the film makes 
an ethical claim on the viewer; the work demands that it be judged based on whether or 
not it was a document made in good faith. Episode III uniquely pressurizes viewers into 
adopting a position: we have to decide whether the work empathizes with or victimizes 
those it involves, those on the receiving end of the crime, those who most acutely feel 
its after-effects. Is it a work of solidarity and sympathy, or is it a work of exposure and 
exploitation? Martens parades misery himself in order to observe how misery is daily 
paraded before the world’s cameras, and to what end? For whom does the film incite 
discomfort? 
 C. F. Bruce, “Episode III: Enjoy Poverty” Communication, Culture & Critique 9 (2016) 51
International Communication Association, 296.
 T.J. Demos, “Toward a New Institutional Critique: A Conversation with Renzo Martens” 52
Ethics, Documents of Contemporary Art, The MIT Press, 2015, 172.
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In an interview Martens explains that what he “tried to make is a document that 
doesn’t explain what exploitation means, but makes one feel what it is.”  Martens is 53
working out of the concern that to employ sympathy as a tool to make images of 
devastation distracts from self-implication. When images of exploitation are met with a 
sympathetic gaze the problem is automatically located somewhere else. That is to say 
that the friendly witness and, by extension, audiences who share the gaze of that 
witness, identify with the suffering displayed, rather than understanding how they 
themselves may contribute to that suffering. Martens claims that “Empathy produces a 
total travesty if it doesn’t unravel the nature of the outsider’s presence. What the world 
calls for is something else, a deeper empathy I’d say.”  Episode III, by avoiding 54
standard cinematic conventions that induce a sympathetic response in the viewer, is 
able to spur an offended but more emotive, more meaningful sense of empathy with the 
subjects of his camera lens. We often expect the artist to offer insight into the economic 
and visual contradictions we live under, or at least to offer beautiful exceptions to that 
world, but Episode III does not offer either of these solutions. Instead, the film presents 
a difficult situation and leaves it there as a confrontation with the viewer.
A recurring frame in the film shows Martens and some assistants carrying metal 
cases while walking through the jungle. Martens takes the lids off the cases being 
carried throughout the film and forms a neon installation reading “ENJOY POVERTY.” 
He connects it to a generator and lights up a night-time festival. A brief scene, but a 
telling moment, shows Martens explaining that the sign is in English, not the native 
 Yulia Tikhonova, “Renzo Martens: Enjoy Poverty,” Flash Art Magazine, Issue 278, May – 53
June, 2011.
 Ibid.54
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Congolese French because “for the audience, it needs to be in English.”  In other 55
words, the Congolese are not the ones for whom poverty is to enjoy. In no uncertain 
terms, Martens conveys his artistic intent that if you can understand Martens’ indictment 
to Enjoy Poverty, he’s addressing you as an English speaking, Western viewer. Episode 
III demands that its Western audience project themselves into the scenes they are 
viewing through self-implication, to understand the power dynamics at play in the 
construction of the work. By intentionally disturbing and alienating his audiences, 
Martens makes viewers ask: what is our relationship to the images we see and how do 
we habitually look at them?
Martens’ Episode III seems to me the clearest example of how agonistic conflict 
functions in terms of challenging hegemony through transgression. Not only does the 
work succeed in doing so, but it is also the explicit aim of the artist to challenge a 
hegemonic order. For Martens “depicting immorality, racism, exploitation, as if they 
were phenomena outside of our lives, as if they existed only on the other side of our 
lenses, relieves us, but it also relieves such a depiction of any claim on reality.”  56
Meaning, that if art limits itself to the morally acceptable, it conveniently obscures the 
problematic production processes that sustain our contemporary art world. Although 
he repeats an unethical image practice, he does so precisely because antagonism 
disrupts the hegemony that perpetuates that same unethical image practice. What sets 
the work apart as exceptionally transgressive is that its artistic vision is not only intent 
on elucidating the hegemonic order, but also to deliberately disturbing it. Episode III is 
 Episode III: Enjoy Poverty dir. Renzo Martens, 2008, http://www.enjoypoverty.com.55
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the most direct evocation of agonistic conflict and the most transgressive of the three 
works. If the aim of agonistic conflict is to shed light on the shortcomings of the 
democracy we already possess, and to renegotiate our democracy to produce a more 
equitable order, Episode III contributes to this process. The film not only sheds light on 
the structure of our own hegemonic order and what this hegemony relies upon (cheap 
labour, exploitation, pervading neocolonialism) by representing it, it also makes further 
ethical demands of its viewers by making them complicit in this inequity.
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CONCLUSION
Although Lamarque, Simon, Adorno, Crane, and Mouffe are employed to defend 
transgressive practices from a variety of perspectives in this thesis, what they all hold in 
agreement is that art teaches, and art’s shocks and disturbances are often justified by 
this overriding purpose. Art ‘teaches’ not by communicating specific lessons but by 
enlarging our sense of what is possible. Transgressive art as social research usually 
does not take the form of structured studies with controlled experiments, but it can still 
provide us with an understanding of ourselves. This understanding is particularly 
attuned to facets of our ethical subjectivity that are not easily articulated or measured. In 
the words of Jean-François Lyotard, transgressive art “makes the world an alien place 
to us, and then returns us to it.”  Viewers can either stand in agreement, or in 57
opposition to the messages conveyed by transgressive work, but rarely do they stand in 
a position of indifference. In this measure, transgressive art practices have the capacity 
to remake our world. 

	 In summation, although both employ tactics of antagonism, shock, and oﬀense, 
we can delineate between transgression and mere oﬀense according to the work’s 
eﬃcacy in challenging hegemony. Works are transgressive when they put into question 
the hegemonic order and works are oﬀensive when they reinforce the hegemonic order. 
The value of these challenges to hegemony lies in the constant need to renegotiate 
democracy, in the need to actively participate in our democratic communities. By being 
open to the opinions of others and by being willing to explain our positions to other 
 Anthony Julius, Transgressions, The Oﬀenses of Art, The University of Chicago Press, 2003, 57
33.
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members of our democratic community, we are more critical and reflexive in our ethical 
commitments. 

	 This process of re-negotiation within and through agonistic conflict can find its 
arena in the arts, because the imaginative distance that the arts facilitate allow an 
encounter with an art work to be just far enough removed that even the most radical 
challenges to our sense of order are disturbing, yet tolerable. The arts oﬀer a unique 
space for the renegotiation of ethics, because by virtue of our imagination, by engaging 
with representations of violence rather than lived violence, we can engage with topics 
otherwise unapproachable. Transgressive practices are uniquely suited to evoking a 
self-assessment of our ethics. By facilitating the experience of oﬀense, the arts allow 
viewers the opportunity to realize what they stand for when being met by radical 
diﬀerence: the transgressive art work. 

	 Open Casket presents a unique challenge to the categorization of oﬀense and 
transgression. It is oﬀensive because of its commodity racism, but the work is also 
ambiguous enough in its formal presentation that it was able to facilitate the same kind 
of agonistic conflict that Mouﬀe advocates, but only as an unintended consequence. It 
is undeniable that the controversy surrounding the exhibition of Open Casket facilitated 
a robust conversation around and criticism of white supremacy in the art institution. 
Because of its critical reception by audiences, I found this diﬃcult to categorize as 
either merely oﬀensive or transgressive. 

	 I outlined the oﬀensive nature of the work using Hannah Black’s claim that the 
painting is an instance of commodity racism, and I compared the function of the 
painting to the similar function of lynching photography, to establish the work’s oﬀense 
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in unambiguous terms. Lemarque’s concept of aesthetic transvaluation was invoked in 
relation to Open Casket as a rationalization against destruction of the work; I argued 
that that although our initial reaction to the painting is one of anger and indignation, we 
can come to appreciate the same work for its pedagogical value, but only in hindsight
—hindsight we don’t yet have. I turned to Simon’s propositions regarding how diﬃcult 
work should be exhibited, and paired his perspective with Lemarque’s, which led me to 
conclude that Open Casket has the potential to be reframed as transgressive as 
opposed to merely oﬀensive depending on how the work is presented curatorially. 
Ultimately, I concluded that if we consider the work through the lens of agonistic 
conflict, Open Casket must be understood to use the tactics of transgression, but it  in 
the case of its exhibition at the 2017 Whitney Biennial, Open Casket ends up 
reinforcing hegemonic racism.

	 Żmijewski’s Game of Tag also poses challenges to its categorization. The 
aesthetic work itself is much more overtly oﬀensive and antagonistic than is Open 
Casket but again, there is just enough ambiguity in the content that the onus is really 
put on the viewer to decide whether or not it victimizes its subjects, or if it trivializes the 
suﬀering of the Holocaust. The work pressures the viewer to make sense of the oﬀense 
they feel, to disentangle and resolve their feelings, which seems to engage the 
audience in agonistic conflict.

	 In the Żmijewski case study I looked to Adorno to consider the work in light of 
his views about representations of the Holocaust. I determined that if Adorno’s criteria 
for ethical representation of the Holocaust is that no pleasure can be derived from the 
work upon its viewing, and that the topic of genocide not be aestheticized pleasurably, 
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then Zmijewski’s aggressive approach is seemingly harmonious with Adorno’s position. 
Crane, in a move similar to Adorno’s, argues that exposure to historic Holocaust 
imagery desensitizes us to the atrocity it indexes. Our engagement with historic atrocity 
imagery cannot be through a disinterested gaze. A more meaningful engagement with 
the past for Crane would be to explicitly look back from the perspective of the 
contemporary, by engaging with the past through the present. Żmijewski’s audiences 
are anything but disinterested when viewing his works, and Żmijewski’s meditation 
upon the traumatic past is indirectly evoked using the contemporary moment. I 
concluded that if Crane’s criteria for a meaningful engagement with Holocaust history 
involves an engaged (as opposed to a disinterested) gaze, and empathy with the 
subjects, then Żmijewski’s work seemingly accomplishes this. 

	 I found Game of Tag to be transgressive as opposed to oﬀensive in so far as we 
agree that the work passes the criteria set out by Adorno and Crane. The onus is put 
on the viewer to decide if the work is oﬀensive or transgressive; either the work evokes 
anti-semitism from audiences, in which case it would be an oﬀensive work, or the work 
evokes outrage at anti-semitic sentiment, in which case it would be transgressive.

	 Martens’ Episode III seems to me the clearest example of how agonistic conflict 
functions in terms of challenging hegemony through transgression. Not only does it 
succeed in doing so but this is also the explicit aim of the artist: to challenge a 
hegemonic order. I found Episode III to be the most direct evocation of agonistic 
conflict and the most transgressive of the three works. Episode III not only sheds lights 
on the structure of our own hegemonic order and what this hegemony relies upon by 
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representing it, but it also makes further ethical demands of its viewers by making them 
complicit in the inequity it presents.

	  Outside the scope of this criticism project, but absolutely essential to mention, 
is that while I agree with Mouﬀe that agonistic conflict is integral to our ongoing 
development of a more radical democracy, I am concerned that the person who gets 
the privilege of renegotiating their ethics through an encounter with the transgressive, 
is not the same person who had to pay the price of that lesson.  From the perspective 
of the curatorial profession, it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to put a price on 
commissioning transgressive works because even if it could be guaranteed that the 
work would be successfully transgressive and not just merely oﬀensive, the question 
remains: just how much of another’s emotional turmoil is a conversation worth? As 
curatorial professionals, how do we begin to take accountability for the reception of a 
work, when the stakes of a work being received as merely oﬀensive, as opposed to 
transgressive, are so high? Although transgressive works may succeeded in 
challenging hegemony, as a curator, the exhibition of oﬀensive work seems an 
incalculable experiment.
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